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The Shrinking Reach of the Commerce
Power: Is Wetland Jurisdiction in
Danger?
JONATHAN G. HIENEMAN*
The United States uses a two-tiered federal system of govern-
ment, with power vested in multiple layers of distinct sovereigns.'
In theory at least, each sovereign, whether state or federal, exercises
complete power within its proper sphere.' Practically speaking,
however, it does not seem that many things in today's world escape
Congressional control because of the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of Congress' commerce power.3 The Court's expan-
sive view has ruled since the New Deal era of the 1930's. 4 Some
consider it merely an academic question whether federalism exists in
the United States at all in the modem era.5
There can be no question that environmental protection is a
compelling concern. 6 It is questionable, however, whether all pro-
. Senior Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1995; B.A., Eastern Kentucky University, 1992.
' H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV.
633, 634 (1993)("According to the Court, 'the principal means chosen by the Framers to
ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal
Government itself."' (citation omitted)); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dor-
mant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J.
569, 591-92 (1987); see also Debra L. Farmer, Recent Development, 68 TUL. L. REV.
1674, 1675 (1994)("Under our federal system of government, the framework within
which Congress may legislate is defined by the powers granted to Congress by and enu-
merated in the Constitution." (citation omitted)).
2 "Although the Constitution allows for a strong national government, it nonethe-
less reserves for the states those powers not delegated to Congress." Farmer, supra note
I, at 1675 (citation omitted).
See infra text accompanying note 16.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 15-38.
5 "It is, therefore, notable that for most of the last half century, the United States
has had no constitutional law of federalism." Powell, supra note 1, at 633.
6 See Robert D. Icsman, Comment, Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, U.S.
EPA: The Seventh Circuit Gets Bogged Down in Wetlands, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 809 (1993);
see generally Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
tective policies are within Congressional power. It has been conclu-
sively established that wetlands which are adjacent to interstate
waterways have a substantial effect on interstate commerce 7 such
that federal regulation is proper.8 The current unresolved question,
however, is whether intrastate, isolated wetlands are subject to fed-
eral regulation under the Clean Water Act.9 It is in this area that the
scope of the Commerce Clause may be decreasing in size. Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence may actually be devolving, and the
intrastate wetland debate exemplifies this potential change in direc-
tion.
A recent article by Stephen Stokes'0 accurately describes the
currently raging debate between environmental regulators and pri-
vate property owners." Stokes states that Congress is without au-
thority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate, isolated
wetlands. 12 Unfortunately, Stokes' article argues without careful
constitutional analysis that the Commerce Clause is somehow limit-
ed. 13 It is not so clear that the Supreme Court would choose to
limit the range of the Commerce Clause as Stokes suggests. One
commentator contends that "too much water has passed over the
dam for there to be a candid judicial reexamination of the commerce
clause that looks only to first principles."' 4 Embracing this idea,
this note will examine recent trends in Commerce Clause jurispru-
Diversity, 18 Ecology L.Q. 265 (1991).
7
Often referred to as "nature's kidneys," wetlands improve water quality by
removing excess nutrients, sediments, and pollutants from water. They
prevent flooding and soil erosion, and provide critical habitat for countless
species of migratory waterfowl and endangered species. They also produce
tremendous quantities of natural products. In addition to those tangible and
intangible economic benefits, wetlands provide immeasurable recreation,
educational, and aesthetic benefits.
Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands, 23 Envtl. L. 1, 2-3
(1993).
' United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
9 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
0 Stephen J. Stokes, Note, The Limit of Government's Regulatory Authority Over
Non-Adjacent Wetlands: Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 15 ENERGY L.J. 137 (1994). See
generally United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
" Stokes, supra note 10, at 138; See generally James S. Burling, Property Rights,
Endangered Species, Wetlands, and Other Critters - Is It Against Nature to Pay for a
Taking?, 27 Land & Water L. Rev. 309 (1992).
12 Stokes, supra note 10, at 149-50.
13 id.
14 Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387 (1987).
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dence, in the context of non-adjacent wetlands, and based on that
premise will suggest that the Court may be embarking on Mr.
Stokes' suggested course.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE COMMERCE POWER AND ITS HISTORY
A great deal of Congressional action in the modem era 15 is
founded on the Commerce Clause, which states Congress has the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."'16 Under the Court's
current interpretation, anything that substantially affects interstate
commerce is properly within the sphere of Congressional regula-
tion.'7
The Commerce Clause evolved to its present interpretation in a
series of cases ranging from Gibbons v. Ogden" in 1824 to
Wickard v. Filburn'9 in 1942.20 In Gibbons the United States Su-
preme Court held that "navigation among the several states was
interstate commerce."'2 During this era, the Court distinguished be-
tween commerce among the states, which Congress could regulate,
and purely local commerce, which was beyond the purview of the
Commerce Clause.22 This distinction remained intact, at least for
the most part, until the New Deal of the 1930's.23
In 1937 the Court abandoned its strict delineation between local
and interstate commerce and adopted a burden test for determining
when an activity "affects" commerce. The Court held in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.24 that "labor disputes may have an
effect on interstate commerce by burdening or obstructing interstate
or foreign commerce. '25 This holding opened the door for expan-
sive federal regulation which is commonplace in today's world.26
"s Since Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930's. See Epstein, supra note 14,
at 1443-54.
16 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
'7 See infra text accompanying note 31.
IS 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
'9 317 U.S. I1 (1942).
20 For a more expansive examination of the evolution of the Commerce Clause, see
generally Michigan Protection and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695, 733
(E.D. Mich. 1992); Epstein, supra note 14.
23 Michigan Protection, 799 F. Supp. at 733.
2 Id. at 734.
2 Id.
24 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
25 Michigan Protection, 799 F. Supp. at 734.
26 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 1447 ("[T]he companion cases to Jones & Laugh-
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Following Jones & Laughlin, the Court decided United States
v. Darby" holding that Congress is permitted "to regulate purely
intrastate activity as long as such regulation [is] necessary to permit
the goal of regulating interstate commerce. 28 At this point the
door that had opened to expansive federal regulation under the
auspices of the commerce power became a broken floodgate. This
expansionist trend culminated in the previously mentioned Wickard
v. Filburn,29 where the Court held the single act in question need
not itself have an ascertainable effect on interstate commerce for
Congress to have jurisdiction. Instead, if the aggregation of like
activities would affect interstate commerce, then Congress could
assert its power under the Commerce Clause and regulate otherwise
wholly local activity. 30 "After Wickard, any activity could be regu-
lated by Congress as long as it had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."3' A substantial effect on interstate commerce remains
the standard for measuring Commerce Clause challenges today,32
and Congressional action will be upheld if Congress' chosen means
are rationally related to achieving some legitimate end.33 If there is
any rational basis for believing that something affects commerce,
then for all practical purposes it does.34
Modem perceptions of the commerce power show the truly
expansive reach it has acquired.35 Congress' efforts at curtailing
fin showed that the 'internal concerns of a state' had become an empty vessel.").
" 312 U.S. 657 (1941).
28 Michigan Protection, 799 F. Supp. at 735 (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 120-23).
2 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
" The facts of Wickard found the Court approving Congressional regulation of the
consumption of home-grown wheat. "That appellee's own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, is far from trivial." Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
3' Michigan Protection, 799 F. Supp. at 735.
32 See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. E.P.A., 961 F.2d 1310, 1317 [hereinafter Hoffman
I], reh'g granted, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992).
33 Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278, 286 (W.D.
La. 1981)("The power of Congress over interstate commerce ... extends to those activi-
ties intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end.").
3' "A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if
it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated
activity affects interstate commerce." Hoffman 1, 961 F.2d at 1317 (quoting Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981)).
35 "As currently interpreted, the Commerce Power has a virtually unlimited sweep."
Doremus, supra note 6, at 293 (citation omitted).
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water pollution in the area of wetland regulation clearly evidence
these perceptions. In Golden Gate Audobon Society v. United States
Army Corps. of Engineers36 the court refers, rather sarcastically, in
a footnote to one of the parties' contentions that the "Corps [of
Engineers] jurisdiction over wetlands is limited because it 'only'
reaches as far as Congress' Commerce Clause power., 37 The court
rejected the argument, indicating that Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause is practically plenary.38
When speaking of the Clean Water Act, 39 courts often recite
language that references limitations imposed by the Commerce
Clause on Congressional, and therefore agency,' jurisdiction.4'
Only one of those courts, however, mentions anything in the context
of wetlands that is beyond the reach of the Clause.42 Significantly,
as discussed below, that court vacated its opinion and replaced it
with one not quite so hostile to the Commerce Clause.43 That
courts pay lip service to the Clause certainly indicates that today we
view it as merely a formalistic vehicle upon which Congress can
place any legislation and thereby drive it through the Constitution.
This view may slowly be changing.
3' 796 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
3' Id. at 1311 n.3 (emphasis in original).
38 id.
'9 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
, This note assumes that all administrative concerns regarding delegation and scope
of agency authority are satisfied, and only questions of Congressional power are at issue.
" See, e.g., Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1211 (Ct. Cl. 1981)("It is
now well settled that Congress, in adopting the latter term, 'asserted federal jurisdiction
over the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce
Clause."); Golden Gate Audobon Society, 796 F. Supp. at 1314 ("Therefore, so long as
there are wetlands on the site, and they are in any way within Congress' Commerce
Clause power, they are subject to the Corps jurisdiction.); Slagle v. United States, 809 F.
Supp. 704, 708 (D. Minn. 1992)("The Supreme Court has recognized Congress' intent to
give 'waters of the United States' the broadest possible meaning under the Commerce
Clause." (citation omitted)); United States v. Akers, 651 F. Supp. 320, 322 (E.D. Cal.
1987)("It has repeatedly been held that Congress intended the statutory definition to
assert 'federal jurisdiction over the Nation's waters to the maximum extent possible
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. "'(citations omitted)). All of these
statements strongly imply that something is beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause,
but they never say what that something is.
42 See, e.g., Golden Gate Audobon Society, 796 F. Supp. at 1313, where the court
referred to exceptions based on the Commerce Clause power, but failed to list any
specifically. This single example is repeated in all of the other wetlands cases, except
Hoffman 1, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 55-70.
'3 See infra text accompanying notes 71-84.
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II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT GRAPPLES WITH THE COMMERCE POWER
IN THE CONTEXT OF NON-ADJACENT WETLANDS
A. Adjacency or Non-Adjacency?
The early cases wrestling with the idea that wetlands could be
considered waters of the United States under § 404 of the Clean
Water Act" developed a standard recognizing adjacent wetlands as
necessary to their neighboring navigable waters. 45 Such wetlands
are therefore subject to Congressional regulation.46 "The Seventh
Circuit... found that regulating wetlands was justified by the nega-
tive effect that destruction of wetlands could have on the 'biologi-
cal, chemical, and physical integrity of the [navigable] lakes they
adjoin."'47 The courts' reliance on the physical proximity between
the questioned wetland and some interstate body of water begs the
question whether wetlands not so geographically, or hydrologically,
situated should be subject to the same regulation." This question
requires an examination of the differences between adjacent
wetlands and isolated, intrastate, or non-adjacent, wetlands.
A wetland is, according to both the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers, an area "that [is] normal-
ly inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency
and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal conditions
[does] support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life
in saturated soil conditions." 49 Significantly, the adjacency require-
ment is not imposed by the regulating agency, but is rather a sub-
stantive requirement imposed by the courts as an incident of the
Commerce Clause.
An adjacent wetland serves to "prevent flooding, to prevent
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
43 See United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 1985).
4 id.
" Tull, 769 F.2d at 185 (quoting Byrd, 609 F.2d at 1210 (citation omit-
ted))(emphasis added).
48 "The original sponsor of H.R. 3199, Congressman Roberts, responded that
'[wietlands adjacent to traditionally navigable waters remain under Federal jurisdiction.
Other wetlands may be regulated by a State under its own program if approved by [the]
EPA."' Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a .National Water Policy
and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873, 904
(1993)(emphasis added).
49 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1992) (EPA); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1992) (Corps). "We-
tlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." Id.; see also lcsman,
supra note 6, at 815 n.25.
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erosion, and to filter and purify water draining into adjacent bodies
of water."5° Based on this reasoning the Seventh Circuit considered
isolated wetlands outside the reach of the Commerce Clause because
they "have no hydrological connection to any body of water."'" A
non-adjacent wetland, then, would be a geographical area satisfying
the regulatory definition for wetland as outlined above,52 but not
bearing any connection to other waters of the United States, and
hence not having a direct bearing on interstate commerce.53 The
question that troubles the courts is whether some other connection to
interstate commerce, like migratory birds, would suffice to warrant
jurisdiction over non-adjacent wetlands under the Clean Water
Act.
54
B. The Hoffman Homes Cases
The case of Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, United
States Environmental Protection Agency55 appeared twice before
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In the first instance the court
denied the E.P.A. jurisdiction over a certain parcel of privately
owned land5 6 because the scope of the Commerce Clause did not
extend far enough to cover it.57 Upon reconsideration of its posi-
tion the court changed its stance regarding the Commerce Clause.58
It reached essentially the same result, however, by declaring the evi-
50 Hoffman 1, 961 F.2d at 1314 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at
134).
"' Hoffman 1, 961 F.2d at 1314.
52 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53 Some connection is necessary between the activity and interstate commerce
before Congress has any power to regulate. This connection is commonly referred to as
the nexus between the activity and commerce. "While the commerce power was being
pushed to the extreme, however, the Court implicitly limited its deference to Congress
by requiring findings or legislative history indicating a nexus between the regulated ac-
tivity and interstate commerce." Farmer, supra note 1, at 1679 (citation omitted).
" Indeed, courts have allowed such other connections. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v.
United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991)
(holding that migratory birds can satisfy the nexus requirement). This decision is exam-
ined in greater detail infra, note 78 and accompanying text.
5' Hoffman I, 961 F.2d 1310, reh'g granted, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992).
56 Known as "Area A." Hoffiman I, 961 F.2d at 1311.
57 Id. ("Because this goes beyond the limits of the Clean Water Act and the Com-
merce Clause, we reverse.").
58 "We also agree with the CJO that it is reasonable to interpret the regulation as
allowing migratory birds to be that connection between a wetland and interstate com-
merce." Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. E.P.A., 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Hoffman II].
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dence insufficient to warrant jurisdiction in the particular case.59
The facts of the Hoffman cases are relatively straightforward.
Hoffman, in preparation for development of a 43 acre parcel of its
property, filled "an 0.8 acre, bowl-shaped depression at the northeast
border of the site."'6 Rainwater could not easily escape the site,
and the E.P.A. classified it as a wetland. 61 It was an isolated, intra-
state wetland because it had "no surface or groundwater connection
to any other body of water. 6 2 The E.P.A. pursued the problem,
and informed Hoffman that remedial action would have to be tak-
en.63 Aside from the administrative issues and the procedural ques-
tions, an Administrative Law Judge found, in Hoffman's favor, that
the E.P.A. had no jurisdiction over Area A.64 When the E.P.A. ap-
pealed this decision, the E.P.A. Chief Judicial Officer (CJO) found
contrary to the ALT, ruling that there was a sufficient connection
with interstate commerce to merit jurisdiction because migratory
birds could use Area A.65 It was at this stage the case came before
the Seventh Circuit.
The Court of Appeals held, in favor of Hoffman, that Area A
was outside the limits of the Commerce Clause. 66 The court recog-
nized that Area A was a non-adjacent wetland, 67 and the estab-
lished criteria defining a connection to interstate commerce were not
present.68 In searching for alternative connections to interstate com-
merce, the Hoffman court developed a test which requires some
connection to human activity before the Commerce Clause can
become applicable in wetlands situations.69 Because the court
found that the E.P.A. had failed to raise any such connection, it
decided that Area A was beyond the reach of the Commerce
Clause. 70 This holding was vacated, and a new one put in its place,
9 Hoffman MI, 999 F.2d at 262.




6 Id. at 1312.
65 id.
66 Hoffman 1, 961 F.2d at 1321 ("[Wle cannot hold that filling Area A has any
effect on interstate commerce.").
617 Id. at 1313 ("Area A is an intrastate, non-adjacent ... wetland.").
68 Id. at 1317.
6 "Thus, in these Commerce Clause precedents, the government has come forward
with some connection, no matter how tenuous, with human activity. ... [W]ithout evi-
dence connecting Area A with some human economic activity, we cannot hold that fil-
ling Area A has any effect on interstate commerce." Hoffman 1, 961 F.2d at 1321.
70 id.
[VOL. 10:2
COMMERCE POWER AND WETLANDS
by the second Hoffman case, to which we now turn.
The facts of Hoffman H are the same as Hoffman I, of course,
and the results of the cases are the same. The difference between the
two cases appears in their methodology. In Hoffman I the court
attacked the Commerce Clause and attempted a persuasive argument
against extending it to cover isolated, non-adjacent wetlands.7 In
Hoffman II the court retreated from its strong position against the
Commerce Clause, and, though conceding that the Clause could
cover non-adjacent wetlands, found the evidence insufficient to
merit coverage on the facts of the present case.72
The court's holding in Hoffman H regarding the Commerce
Clause is more in line with modem interpretations of the Clause
than its previous holding in Hoffman I. Essentially the question
before the court was whether migratory birds could serve as the
nexus between a wetland and interstate commerce, such that the
wetland would be subject to regulation pursuant to the authority of
the Commerce Clause.
Allowing migratory waterfowl to define the outer limits of the
Commerce Clause is substantially equal to placing no limits whatso-
ever on the Clause. In his concurrence to Hoffman II Judge Manion
makes this point quite clear, stating, "[t]he commerce power is
indeed expansive, but not so expansive as to authorize regulation of
puddles merely because a bird traveling interstate might decide to
stop for a drink."73 It is precisely because of this limitless potential
of the Commerce Clause that migratory birds provide an excellent
stopping point, and it is the tension between drawing a line and
continuing unfettered expansion that is evident in the Seventh
Circuit's handling of the non-adjacent wetland issue.
Analyzing the question in terms of the rational basis test out-
lined above,74 migratory birds should not serve as the nexus be-
tween non-adjacent wetlands and interstate commerce because the
purported goal of the Clean Water Act has little to do with water-
fowl. The stated purpose of the Act "is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters. 75 Accepting that purpose, if one is to put any limits on the
7 See Hoffmnan , 961 F.2d at 1316-23.
72 "Based on our examination of the record, we find the CJO's conclusion that
Area A was suitable for migratory bird habitat to be unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole." Hoffman 11, 999 F.2d at 262.
" Hoffman 11, 999 F.2d at 263 (Manion, J., concurring.)
71 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
71 United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1211 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
1994-95]
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Commerce Clause, means that the "Nation's waters" must be some-
how limited,76 or else "maintain[ing] the ... integrity of [water]"
would allow for the regulation of any water in the country. "Main-
taining the ... biological integrity of the Nation's waters" does not
necessarily include migratory waterfowl.
One potential limitation, short of disqualifying all non-adjacent
wetlands from Congressional control on this basis, would be to
allow regulation of those non-adjacent wetlands that actually support
migratory waterfowl or some endangered species. The Ninth Circuit
promoted this approach in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States.77 It
stated that, "[t]he commerce clause power, and thus the Clean Water
Act, is broad enough to extend the Corps' jurisdiction to local wa-
ters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered
species.78 After recognizing this potential base for jurisdiction, the
court then remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of
whether the wetland in question actually had the "requisite connec-
tions to interstate commerce., 79 The Seventh Circuit chose not to
follow this course in the Hoffman cases, but it did come close in
one respect. In Hoffman II the court recognized the potential reach
of the Commerce Clause, but held that no connection was shown
between the birds and interstate commerce and therefore found for
Hoffman.80 The only real difference between Leslie Salt and
Hoffman II is that the latter court chose not to remand the case for
further factual findings. Thus, the message from Hoffman I is clear:
the Seventh Circuit requires any alleged connection between migra-
tory birds and interstate commerce to be shown initially, because
parties will not be given a second chance.
Hoffman I did more than require a connection between the
alleged waterfowl and interstate commerce. It strongly implied that
such a connection could only be satisfied if the wetland was actually
used by waterfowl."' The case recognized a connection between
waterfowl and human activity generally, in that persons often travel
§ 1251(a)); see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
76 "To hold that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate
isolated wetlands would be to hold the Commerce Clause virtually unlimited." Stokes,
supra note 10, at 150 (citation omitted).
7 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991).
78 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
79 id.
80 Hoffman II, 999 F.2d at 262.
" "The migratory birds are better judges of what is suitable for their welfare than
are we, the AU or CJO. Having avoided Area A the migratory birds have thus spoken
and submitted their own evidence." Hoffman I1, 999 F.2d at 262.
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to hunt, observe, or photograph migratory birds.8 2 This connection
is not necessarily enough, however, in the case of a particular wet-
land. The Hoffman II holding leaves open the question of whether a
non-adjacent wetland, which migratory birds could, but do not, use
would be within the reach of the Commerce Clause. Also, would a
wetland actually used by waterfowl but so isolated that the human
contact with the birds is cut off be within reach? The Seventh Cir-
cuit has answered some questions for the birds, but has left itself
some room to limit its decision in the future.
Recently, in Rueth v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency83 the court explained its prior decision, stating that "nearly
all wetlands fall within the jurisdiction of the [Clean Water Act]
since one test for whether the wetland affects interstate commerce is
whether migratory birds use the wetland. 84 Whatever the amount
of maneuvering room left open by the court in Hoffman II, the
Rueth decision indicates the court will look harshly at any attempts
toward exclusion of wetlands. In Rueth the court effectively backed
down from any limitations it sought to impose on the Commerce
Clause in the Hoffman cases.
C. Departing from the Rational Basis and other Constitutional Tests
Even though the Seventh Circuit backed away from its initial
restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, it still has indicat-
ed the Clause has lost some of its former glory. The court makes
this clear by heralding the broad reach of the Commerce Clause,
and using other principles to carve out exceptions to it.
In both Hoffman I and Hoffraan H the court asked not whether
non-adjacent wetlands as a group fell within the range of Commerce
Clause regulation, but instead whether the particular wetland in
question fell within the range.85 If the court had focused on isolat-
ed wetlands as a class, then under the current broad interpretation of
the Commerce Clause86 it would almost certainly have found cov-
82 Id. at 261.
'3 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993).
'4 Id. at 231.
8 Compare Hoffman 1, 961 F.2d at 1317 ("[W]e held that adjacent wetlands were
within 'constitutional reach' ... The issue thus becomes: Is Area A within constitutional
reach under the Commerce Clause?") with Hoffman H, 999 F2d. at 262 ("[W]e find the
CJO's conclusion that Area A was suitable for migratory bird habitat to be unsupported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.")(emphasis added)).
86 See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
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erage. Also, the court required more than a mere allegation of a
connection to interstate commerce before it would allow regulation
of a non-adjacent wetland.87
Both of the preceding restrictions, though certainly limited in
scope, illustrate a departure from traditional rational basis review.
When reviewing Commerce Clause questions, courts generally must
allow Congressional regulation if the chosen means are somehow
reasonably related to a legitimate end.88 In practical terms this
translates into the courts accepting any possible rationale for a law
or regulation, as long as the end is legitimate.89 The limits imposed
by the Seventh Circuit are significant because the court chose not to
bend over backwards and dream up some possible, albeit tenuous,
connection to interstate commerce. This is very different from usual
judicial treatment of Commerce Clause issues.
III. WILL NARROW INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
BECOME THE NORM?
While in one breath acknowledging the broad reach of the
Clause, the Seventh Circuit, in the next breath, worked its way out
of applying the Clean Water Act.90 This would not be so signifi-
cant if the court had not attempted, in Hoffman I, to restrict the
application of the Commerce Clause altogether. When viewed in
this light it seems that Hoffman H is little more than subversive.
Does the court's decision to reach the same result through different
methods in the Hoffman cases equate with a limitation of the Com-
8 "No justification whatsoever is seen from the evidence to interfere with private
ownership based on what appears to be no more than a well intentioned effort in these
particular factual circumstances to expand government control beyond reasonable or prac-
tical limits. After April showers not every temporary wet spot necessarily becomes sub-
ject to government control." Hoffman /1, 999 F.2d at 262. This certainly indicates that
more than an hypothetical connection between birds and wetlands is necessary.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
9 For example, in the area of federal criminal law, a potential effect on interstate
commerce is enough to merit federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. See e.g.,
United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837
(1975), where a payoff made to an alderman for a proposed zoning change was held
enough of a potential effect on commerce, even though the builder changed his mind,
the proposed building was never built, and the zoning change never took place. The
court reasoned that the jury could reasonably find that had the zoning change taken
place, the building would probably have been built with out of state materials, and thus
interstate commerce would likely have been affected. Id. at 60. The Seventh Circuit
certainly rejected this method in the context of non-adjacent wetlands.
o Hoffman II, 999 F.2d at 260-263.
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merce Clause? It may well be that it does.
In Hoffman I the court decided that the Commerce Clause
could reach no further in the wetlands context than it already did.9'
In light of the previously discussed unassailable status of the
Clause,92 it seems only reasonable that the Seventh Circuit would
choose to recharacterize its position, and refuse to be the court that
explicitly said the Clause could cover no more ground. So instead,
the same three judges93 decided to achieve substantially the same
result using different, and less constitutionally bold, language. 94
The fact that the court even considered beginning to limit the
Clause is itself significant. Some commentators believe that the
commerce power is already too expansive,95 and it is not too much
of a stretch to imagine that Hoffman I shows that at least one court
may feel the same way. Hoffman II quite possibly only shows that
the Seventh Circuit was unwilling to take the first limiting
step-and not that it really changed its mind about the scope of the
commerce power.
Another court recently offered its opinion about the scope of
the Commerce Clause, and it indicated that some reigning in needs
to be done. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Lopez,96 decided
that the Clause does not reach all the way to protecting "gun free
school-zones. '97 As one commentator noted, the Lopez court "ac-
knowledged and respected the vast scope of the commerce power
and speculated that with adequate findings or legislative history,
congressional legislation similar to [the Act] could be sustained." 98
The Lopez analysis is strikingly similar in some respects to the
wetlands cases, wherein the courts routinely recognize that "the
commerce power is not unlimited."99 The Fifth Circuit recognized
that "there must be some limit on the commerce power because in
theory, especially under Wickard's 'cumulative effect' concept,
virtually any intrastate activity could be found to have some effect
9' See supra discussion accompanying notes 55-71.
9' See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
93 Judges Manion, Wood, and Roszkowski heard both cases, with Judge Manion
writing the opinion in Hoffman I and concurring in Hoffman II. Judge Wood wrote the
Hoffman II opinion.
94 Judge Manion, in his concurrence to Hoffmnan I1, stood by his previous opinion.
At least one of the other judges changed his mind.
95 See generally, Epstein, supra note 14.
96 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
9' Id. at 1367-68; see Farmer, supra note 1, at 1675.
9 Farmer, supra note 1, at 1684 (footnotes omitted).
99 Id.; see also supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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on interstate commerce."' Thus, the Seventh Circuit is not alone
in beginning to restrict the commerce power. The Fifth Circuit has
gone through much the same process in determining something to
be outside Congressional power. It seems likely that this currently
developing trend will continue.
In affirming the Fifth Circuit decision, the United States
Supreme Court wrote,
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to
pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admitted-
ly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road,
giving great deference to congressional action .... This we are
unwilling to do.0'0
The Court found it appropriate to stop the unfettered expansion of
the commerce power at the school yard because the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, "neither regulates a commercial activity nor
contains a requirement that the possession [of a gun] be connected
in any way to interstate commerce.'1°2
The Lopez decision continues a trend of the Court toward cur-
tailing the scope of the Clause. In New York v. United States °3
the Court revived some of its federalism jurisprudence and removed
certain aspects of state action from the reach of the Commerce
Clause.' 0° It is unnecessary in this note to examine the details of
that decision. Instead, it is significant that in both the New York and
Lopez opinions the Court has taken the opportunity to encourage
federalism, and limit the scope of the commerce power.
For wetlands this emerging reassessment of the commerce
power is quite important. Because the United States Supreme Court
determined, in its consideration of Lopez, that the Clause can be
limited in its reach, future courts of appeals in positions similar to
that of the Seventh Circuit may not feel as constrained as the
Hoffman court did.
'to Farmer, supra note 1, at 1684 (footnote omitted).
'0' United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
'02 Id., at 1626.
'03 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992).
"'4 Id. (involving constitutional challenge to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act); see generally Powell, supra note 1.
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IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF THE
COMMERCE POWER
There are several potential results that could flow from a chan-
ging perspective regarding the Commerce Power. The New York
decision mentions three methods that the federal government has
available for encouraging state action."0 5 It is not unreasonable to
carry these incentive programs into other contexts, including the
wetlands area. There are methods through which Congress could
achieve its intended protective results without instituting direct
regulation. These methods, which will require incentives offered to
the states for certain actions, may become necessary if the Court
changes the scope of the Commerce Clause.
If Congress is forced to adopt an alternative strategy to protect
wetlands or other environmental interests, will there be areas that
Congress cannot protect? It is likely that Congressional reach will
remain as expansive as it currently is, though Commerce Clause
limitations might require greater substantive state participation in
environmental programs. This could result in differing environmen-
tal policies from region to region, and perhaps a lag in protection
for a period of time between Commerce Clause restructuring and
implementation of Congress' new methodology. Neither of these
problems is likely to be severe, however, and should not prevent the
Court from reconsidering its Commerce Clause position. Both po-
tential problems merit further study, but they can no doubt be
solved.
CONCLUSION
Though the trend is far from clear, there appears to be a re-
evaluation of the Commerce Clause taking place in our nation's
court system. The debate over Congressional control of intrastate
wetlands serves as an excellent example of how this reevaluation is
emerging. The debate over the extent of the Commerce Clause is
not likely to subside in the near future, but the view that its breadth
should be reduced is growing in strength.
For wetlands to remain within the scope of Congressional
'o5 "The Act provides three types of incentives to encourage the States to comply
with their statutory obligation to provide for the disposal of waste generated within their
borders." New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2416. The three types were mandatory incentives,
access incentives, and a take title provision. Id.
1994-95]
356 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. [VOL. 10:2
control, it is imperative that some significant connection of the
particular wetland in question to interstate commerce be established
at the outset. A wetland without such a connection may fall outside
Congressional authority, and according to the Seventh Circuit, par-
ties will not receive a second chance at establishing the required
connection. There are limits to the scope of the commerce power,
and parties must prove a connection to interstate commerce initially
in order to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements now imposed by
the Commerce Clause.
